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enerally, technological progress proceeds at a slow and measured
pace, with only incremental improvements seen in existing products
and technologies in the economy. At times, however, the pace accel-
erates, and the economy experiences a technological revolution during which
radically new products and technologies are introduced. Recent discussions sug-
gest that the world economy is currently experiencing just such a revolution,
or paradigm shift, and that this revolution accounts for some of the observed
decline and rebound of productivity growth. For example, David (1991) argues
that the effect of information technologies on today’s economy is comparable
to the effects of the introduction of the dynamo and the subsequent avail-
ability of electric power in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.
It is important to understand the effects of technological progress as reﬂected
in productivity growth because productivity growth determines the economy’s
long-run growth of output, consumption, and factor income such as wages.
In this article I consider one particular parable of a paradigm shift. This
story builds on three assumptions: ﬁrst, that technological change is associated
with the introduction of new goods, in particular that new technologies are em-
bodied in new machines; second, that production units learn about the newly
introduced technologies, that is, new technologies do not immediately attain
their full productivity potential, but instead productivity increases gradually for
some time; and third, that the experience which production units have with
existing technologies affects their ability to adopt new technologies.1
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In the following pages I summarize the available evidence in support of
these assumptions and then speculate on the possible implications of a paradigm
shift for future output and productivity growth based on a parametric version
of the standard neoclassical growth model. I ﬁnd that all three assumptions
together can account for a substantial and long-lasting decline in measured
productivity and output growth during the initial stages of a technological rev-
olution. This initial period is then followed by a long period of above-average
long-run growth. Unfortunately, the results depend crucially on how experi-
ence with existing technologies affects the ability to adopt new technologies,
a feature of the economy about which we know very little. An alternative
parameterization of this feature of the economy predicts that the effects of a
technological revolution on productivity and output growth might be negligible.
Finally, I reconsider the evidence on the slowdown of measured productivity
growth and ﬁnd that it appears to be less dramatic if we calculate real output
numbers using a more reliable price index.
1. SOME EVIDENCE ON TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
The Rate of Capital-Embodied Technological Change has
Accelerated in the Early ’70s
When people talk about a new technological revolution, they usually refer to
the more widespread use of computers: the application of computers makes
new products and services possible, it changes the way production processes
are organized, and it is no longer limited to a small fraction of the economy.
Unfortunately, many of these observations are anecdotal and provide only lim-
ited quantitative support for the impact of computers on the economy. There is
one observation, however, that we all make and that might well be quantiﬁed;
namely, that each new generation of PCs tends to do more things faster than
the previous generation, yet we do not have to pay more for these higher-
quality PCs. In short, for PCs the price-per-quality unit has been declining at
a dramatic rate. This observation applies not only to PCs but to many other
products, particularly producer-durable goods such as new capital goods.
While it is easy to say that new products are of better quality, it is difﬁcult
to actually measure and compare quality across different goods. In an extensive
study, Gordon (1990) has constructed measures of the price of producer-durable
equipment that account for quality changes. The line labeled 1/q in Figure 1
graphs the price of new producer-durable equipment relative to the price of
nondurable consumption for the postwar U.S. economy.2 I identify the rate of
2 The series on the relative price of producer-durable equipment is from Greenwood, Her-
cowitz, and Krusell (1997). I have extrapolated the series from 1990 on using information on the
price of producer-durable equipment from the National Income Accounts. Consumption covers
nondurable goods and services, excluding housing services. Hornstein (1999) provides a complete
description of the data used.      
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Figure 1 Measures of Embodied and Disembodied Technological Change
price decline with increased productivity in the capital goods producing sector
that is embodied in the new capital goods.3 In this ﬁgure it is apparent that
producer-durable equipment goods have become cheaper over time relative to
consumption goods and that the rate of price decline has accelerated in the
mid-’70s from 3 percent before 1973 to 4.3 percent after 1977. A substantial
part of the accelerated rate of price decline can be attributed to the fact that in-
formation technologies have gained more widespread application in the design
of producer-durable equipment.
Learning-by-Doing is an Important Feature of Production
New products or new plants do not attain their full potential at the time they
are introduced. Rather, we ﬁnd that for some period of time productivity for
3 In general, relative prices may change because the technology changes (shift of the pro-
duction possibility frontier, PPF) or because of simple substitution between goods (movements
along a PPF). Notice, however, that with an unchanged technology we would expect the relative
price of a good to fall only if relatively less of the good is produced. Yet we have not observed
a decline in the investment rate that should correspond to the decline in the relative price of
capital. Work that tries to account for substitution effects ﬁnds even more acceleration in the rate
of capital-embodied technological change (Hornstein and Krusell 1996).       
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a new good or plant is increasing. This increase in productivity is attributed
to learning-by-doing (LBD); that is, ﬁrms acquire experience and improve
their efﬁciency in resource use in the process of producing a good. One can
think of this process as the accumulation of informational capital. This LBD
phenomenon is so widespread and uniform across industries that the manage-
ment literature summarizes it with the “20 percent rule,” according to which
labor productivity increases by 20 percent for every doubling of cumulative
production (see, e.g., Hall and Howell [1985]).
One of the most frequently cited LBD examples is the case of the liberty
ships of World War II. The more ships a navy yard built, the smaller was the la-
bor input required for the next vessel it built (Figure 2). A more recent example
of LBD is the production of dynamic random access memory (DRAM) chips
in the semiconductor industry. Figure 3 displays the time paths for the average
unit price and total shipments of successive generations of DRAM chips. This
ﬁgure displays two common features of LBD. First, productivity improvements
during the early stages of production are dramatic. Second, these improvements
are attained within a short period of time, occurring within the ﬁrst three to ﬁve
years of production. Indeed, most of the productivity improvements have been
made once shipments of a chip generation reach their peak. Notice also that
during the ﬁrst few years a new generation of chips is produced, the unit price is
higher than the one of the previous generation.4 The DRAM chip example also
points to an important feature for my discussion of accelerated capital-embodied
technological change: How much of the experience accumulated in the produc-
tion of one generation of DRAM chips can be transferred to the production
of the next generation of chips? More generally, how much of the experience
accumulated for existing technologies can be applied to new technologies? The
answer to this question is still open. Evidence from the semiconductor industry
indicates that the transfer of experience is limited (Irwin and Klenow 1994).
New Technologies Diffuse Slowly Through the Economy
When a radically new technology becomes available, not everybody in the
economy will adopt this new technology simultaneously. For some time the
use of the old and new technology will coexist while ﬁrms continue to make
improvements in the old technology. This situation will occur since there are
costs to adopting new technologies such as learning costs. Potentially, a new
technology may be much more productive than the old technology, but initially
users of the new technology have to start with a low experience level relative
to that of old technologies.
4 My interpretation that a decline in average unit price reﬂects an increase in productivity
should be taken with a grain of salt since the market structure in the semiconductor industry is
only approximately competitive.        
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Figure 2 Reductions in Man-Hours per Vessel with Increasing Production
Source: Lucas (1993).
The idea that new technologies diffuse slowly through the economy relates
to the observation that the use of new products diffuses slowly through the
economy. Experts have made this observation for a wide variety of products
from diesel locomotives to DRAM chips (Figures 3 and 4).5 David (1991)
makes a similar observation on the diffusion of the use of electrical power in
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.
2. TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION IN A SIMPLE MODEL OF
CAPITAL-EMBODIED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
AND LEARNING
The appearance of a new technology in the economy can signiﬁcantly affect
output and productivity growth during the transitional period when the new
technology replaces the old technology. These effects come about because
learning introduces another kind of capital that is not measured, informational
5 Figure 3b plots shipments of DRAM chips from different generations, and Figure 4 plots
the numbers of diesels in use as a fraction of the total number of locomotives.     
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Figure 3 Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors
Source: Irwin and Klenow (1994).
capital, and during the transitional period this capital stock can change signiﬁ-
cantly. This change in informational capital has real output growth effects, and
it creates a problem for measuring productivity growth.    
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Figure 4 Diesel Locomotion in the U.S. Railroad Industry,
1925–66: Diffusion
Source: Jovanovic and McDonald (1994).
Informational capital represents the economy’s experience with various
vintages of capital goods, and it is not part of our standard measure of capital.
Consequently, we do not measure changes of informational capital that occur
during transitional periods. In particular, after we correct for depreciation, we
assign the same value to capital from different vintages. So during transitional
periods when substantial investment in new technologies with lower experience
occurs, we tend to overestimate the contribution to output from investment in
these new technologies. Because we overestimate capital accumulation, we
underestimate total factor productivity growth. There is also a real effect of
learning, since output growth slows down in the transitional period. A feature
of this learning is that during the transitional period, production with new
technologies is relatively less efﬁcient than production with old technologies.         
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In the next section I will try to quantify the implications for output and
productivity growth measurement when a new technology is introduced in a
simple vintage capital model with learning. The structure of the model is very
mechanical and many of the elements discussed above are taken as exogenous.
The Solow Growth Model and Growth Accounting
I will start with the standard Solow growth model, which assumes a neoclassical
production structure and a constant savings and investment rate. Each period, a
homogeneous good yt is produced using a constant-returns-to-scale technology





where the elasticity of output with respect to capital satisﬁes 0 <α<1. For
simplicity I have assumed a Cobb-Douglas production function. Technological
change is represented through changes in total factor productivity zt and is
disembodied; that is, with the same inputs, output increases when total factor
productivity (TFP) increases. The economy’s endowment of labor is ﬁxed,
nt = 1. The output good can be used for consumption ct or investment it:
ct + it = yt. (2)
Investment is used to augment the capital stock and capital depreciates at a
constant rate δ:
kt+1 = (1 − δ)kt + it, (3)
and 0 <δ<1. Expenditures on investment are assumed to be a constant
fraction σ of output,
it = σyt, (4)
and 0 <σ<1.
Assume that TFP grows at a constant rate, zt+1 = γzzt and γz ≥ 1. It can
be easily veriﬁed that an equilibrium exists for this economy where output,
consumption, investment, and the capital stock all grow at constant rates. Such
an equilibrium is called a balanced growth path. For the following let gx denote
the gross growth rate of the variable x: that is, gx = xt/xt−1. From the savings
equation (4), it follows that if both investment and output grow at a constant
rate, then they must grow at the same rate, gy = gi = g. In turn, the resource
constraint (2) shows that consumption must grow at that same rate gc = g.
Dividing the capital accumulation equation (3) by the capital stock kt subse-
quently shows that if the capital stock grows at a constant rate, it must grow at
the same rate as investment, gk = g. Finally, the production function (1) relates
the economy’s output growth rate to the growth of inputs and the exogenous            
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productivity growth rate g = gy = γzgα
k = γzgα.6 From this expression one
can see that the economy’s growth rate on the balanced growth path increases
with the productivity growth rate and with the capital elasticity of output,
g = γ1/(1−α)
z . (5)
We know that TFP in this economy is zt, but how can we measure TFP if
we do not observe zt? In order to calculate the percentage change of TFP, take
the log of equation (1), take the ﬁrst difference,7 and solve for the TFP growth
rate ˆ z,
ˆ zt = ˆ yt − αˆ kt − (1 − α)ˆ nt.
Here the measure of TFP growth requires observations on the growth rates of
output and inputs and knowledge of the parameter α. Solow’s (1957) important
insight was that in a competitive economy α can be measured through obser-
vations on factor income shares. Suppose that all markets in this economy are
competitive and that everybody has access to the technology represented by
(1). Then consider a ﬁrm that maximizes proﬁts, sells the output good at a
price pt, and hires labor (capital) services at the wage rate wt (capital rental
rate ut). In order to maximize proﬁts, the ﬁrm will hire labor (capital) services
until the marginal revenue from the last unit of labor (capital) services hired
equals its price:
ptMPNt = pt (1 − α)ztkα
t n
−α





t = ut. (6b)
Multiplying each side of the equation with nt/ptyt (kt/ptyt) shows that the labor
(capital) coefﬁcient in the production function equals the share in total revenues
that goes to labor (capital):8
1 − α = wtnt/ptyt = snt
α = utkt/ptyt = skt.
6 From equations (1), (3), and (4), it follows that a balanced growth path is associated with
a particular level of the capital stock in the initial period k0. One can show that the economy
converges toward this balanced growth path if it starts with a different level of capital.
7 In the following, a hat denotes the net growth rate of a variable: for example, ˆ xt = (xt −
xt−1)/xt. For small changes in a variable, the ﬁrst difference of the logs approximates the growth
rate; for example, ˆ xt = lnxt − lnxt−1.
8 Since the two coefﬁcients sum to one, total payments to the two production factors capital
and labor exhaust revenues; that is, there are zero proﬁts. This is not speciﬁc to the assumption
of a Cobb-Douglas production function. In general, proﬁts are zero when production is constant
returns to scale and all markets are competitive.         
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We can therefore measure productivity growth using observations on output
growth, input growth, and factor income shares. This measure of TFP growth
is the Solow residual:
ˆ zm
t = ˆ yt − sktˆ kt − sntˆ nt = ˆ zt. (7)
The Solow residual provides an accurate measure of disembodied technological
change not only for a Cobb-Douglas production structure but for any constant-
returns-to-scale economy, as long as we are willing to assume that all markets
are competitive. Finally, note that the wage and capital rental rate equations (6a
and 6b) also imply that on a balanced growth path real wages wt/pt will grow
at the economywide growth rate g, which is determined by the productivity
growth rate, and that the real rental rate of capital is constant.
Capital-Embodied Technological Change
The secular decline of the relative price of producer-durable goods suggests that
a substantial part of technological progress is embodied in new capital goods. A
straightforward modiﬁcation allows me to account for capital-embodied tech-
nological change in the Solow growth model. In the model described above the
homogeneous output good can be used for consumption or investment, and the
marginal rate of transformation between consumption and investment goods is
ﬁxed. In particular I have assumed that one unit of the consumption good can
be transformed into qt units of the investment good and qt = 1. In order to
show that over time the economy becomes more efﬁcient in the production
of capital goods, I simply assume that over time qt grows at a constant rate,
qt+1 = γqqt and γq ≥ 1. The resource constraint for the output good is now
ct + it/qt = yt. (2a)
At the same time that the economy becomes more efﬁcient in the production
of capital goods, the relative price of capital goods 1/qt declines. I continue to
measure output in terms of consumption goods and assume that expenditures on
investment goods in terms of consumption goods represent a constant fraction
of income:
it/qt = σyt. (4a)
Analogous to the previous economy, there is a balanced growth path where
output, consumption, investment, and capital all grow at constant rates:
gy = gc = (γzγα
q )1/(1−α) and gi = gk = (γzγq)1/(1−α). (5a)
The measurement of TFP, that is, disembodied technological change, is
affected in two ways by the presence of capital-embodied technological change.
First, the capital stock measure is constructed as the cumulative sum of unde-
preciated past investment based on equation (3). Since changes in the quality of        
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new capital goods are the hallmark of embodied technological change, we have
to use an appropriate price index that accounts for these quality changes when
we deﬂate nominal investment series to obtain real investment expenditures.
Second, because the relative price between consumption and investment goods
is changing over time, we have to decide whether we want to measure output
in terms of consumption or investment goods. Since ultimate well-being in the
economy depends on the availability of consumption goods, I decide to measure
output in terms of consumption goods. The line labeled z in Figure 1 displays
the measured TFP levels for the postwar U.S. economy. Here the measured
capital stock is adjusted for embodied technological change using data on the
relative price of durable goods.9 Notice that contrary to capital-embodied tech-
nological change, which was positive for all of the postwar period, measured
TFP does not represent a success story for the U.S. economy. Although TFP
was increasing rapidly in the late ’50s and ’60s, TFP stagnated in the early
’70s and has actually declined since the mid-’70s when the rate of embodied
technological change accelerated. Recently, starting in the ’90s, there has been
a slight recovery of TFP, but the apparent negative trend in the ’70s and ’80s
seems hard to rationalize.
Learning and Growth Accounting
The observed decline in measured TFP could simply be due to measurement
error; that is, there never was a decline in actual TFP. To make sense of this
explanation I provide a candidate for what has been mismeasured, and I argue
why the measurement problem got worse in the mid-’70s and why we now
observe a trend reversal. I suggest that the effective stock of capital has been
mismeasured. In particular, I consider the possibility that standard measures of
capital do not include informational capital in the economy. In the following I
introduce informational capital into the Solow growth model through a simple
model of learning. I show that even though measured capital does not include
informational capital, there is no measurement problem on the balanced growth
path; the measured capital stock may overestimate the effective capital stock
during transitional periods when there are signiﬁcant changes in the economy’s
informational capital stock.
Assume that new capital goods do not immediately attain their full poten-
tial, but in the process of producing goods, more is learned about each capital
good and the efﬁciency with which it is used increases over time. We now have
to distinguish between different vintages of capital goods because a producer
has less experience with a capital good that is newly introduced than with a
capital good that has been around for some time. Let kt,a denote a capital good
9 The measure of TFP is based on work by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) as
extended in Hornstein (1999). For a more detailed description see either of the two references.              
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that is a years old at time t. If this capital good is employed with nt,a units of





where et,a is the experience index of a capital good that is a years old. For
simplicity I assume that maximal experience is one and convergence to it is
geometric at rate λ:
1 − et+1,a+1 = λ(1 − et,a) for a = 1 ,2 ,..., ( 8 )
starting from some initial experience level 0 ≤ et,1 ≤ 1, and 0 <λ<1.
I continue to assume that capital depreciates at rate δ:
kt+1,a+1 = (1 − δ)kt,a. (3a)







nt,a, and it = kt+1,1, (9)
and I continue to assume that the markets for output, labor, and the different
capital vintages are all competitive. An attractive feature of this model is the
existence of an exact aggregate capital index. We can write aggregate output as
a Cobb-Douglas function of total employment and the aggregate capital index
¯ k :10
yt = zt¯ kα
t n
1−α





From this expression one can see how informational capital, et = {et,a : a =
1,2, . . .}, affects aggregate output. Note that the usual measure of the
10 The aggregate capital index can be derived as follows. A proﬁt-maximizing competitive
ﬁrm using vintage a capital goods hires labor until it equates the marginal revenue of labor with
its marginal cost, p(1 − α)zeakα
a n−α
a = w. Solving this expression for na deﬁnes the demand
for labor by ﬁrms using vintage a capital, na = [(1 − α)zea/(w/p)]1/αka. The real wage w/p then








a ka = [(1 − α)z/(w/p)]1/α¯ k.
One can solve this expression for the equilibrium real wage, substitute it in the labor demand
equation, and obtain the output of ﬁrms using vintage a capital as ya = ze1/α





ya = z¯ kαn1−α.        
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economy’s capital stock as the sum of undepreciated past investment does





kt,a = (1 − δ)km
t−1 + it−1. (9b)
To close the model I identify what determines initial experience with a new
capital good. I assume that there is an externality, and experience with older








with 0 <ρ<1 and θ>0. This formulation of the learning externality follows
Lucas (1993). The factor ρa measures the extent to which experience with vin-
tage a contributes to initial experience with new capital goods. The larger that
ρ is, the more important is experience with existing capital goods. Since ρ<1,
experience with older vintages is less important for the initial experience with
a new capital good. Notice also that I have assumed the contribution of vintage
a is weighted by how intensively this vintage is used, whereby I measure the
intensity of use by the share in employment.
The balanced growth path of this economy is very similar to the path of
the previous economy. Output, consumption, investment, and capital grow at
the same rates, and the initial experience e1 is constant. Because the initial
experience is constant, the informational capital does not change, eta = ea,
and the exact aggregate capital index (9a) and the measured capital stock (9b)
grow at the same rate. Therefore, the Solow residual accurately reﬂects true
growth of TFP. If the economy is not on the balanced growth path, three things
happen. Initial experience and the informational capital changes over time,
changes in the measured capital stock do not accurately reﬂect changes in the
exact aggregate capital index, and the Solow residual mismeasures true TFP
growth.
The economy may not be on its balanced growth path for various reasons.
Here I consider the possibility that the acceleration of capital-embodied tech-
nological change in the mid-’70s was associated with a qualitative change in
the kind of technology used. Furthermore, the adoption of this new technology
proceeded gradually. To be more speciﬁc assume that at some time t0 this new
qualitatively different technology becomes available. From this point on I dis-
tinguish between vintages belonging to the old technology, i = 1, and vintages
belonging to the new technology, i = 2. This means that in any time period
t output, capital, employment, and experience are now indexed by the type of




t,a}. I assume that the new tech-
nology is potentially better because capital-embodied technological progress          
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ﬁrst, however, the new technology may be worse because the economy has
less experience with it. Since the new technology may be initially inferior, I
assume that the new technology diffuses slowly. In particular, only a fraction
ψt of total investment expenditures is used for the purchase of capital goods





= 0 for t < t0,
∈ (0,1) for t = t0 + 1,..., t0 + T,
= 1 for t > t0 + T,
(10)
and ψt increases monotonically. As before, initial experience ei for a new vin-










For completeness assume that the experience of a new technology vintage that
never existed is zero; that is, e2
ta = 0 for t − a < t0.11
In order to consider the quantitative implications of the diffusion of a new
technology, I select parameter values for the economy that are consistent with
observations on long-run growth, the evidence on the accelerated embodied
technological change, learning in the economy, and the diffusion of new tech-
nologies.
In the postwar U.S. economy, the average annual depreciation rate is about
10 percent, the average investment rate is about 20 percent, and the average
capital income share is about 30 percent. I assume that there is no disembodied
technological change such that we can interpret the output and measured TFP
growth rates as possible losses/gains due to the diffusion of a new technology. I
also assume that the new technology is implemented beginning in 1974 and that
it will take 40 years for all new investment to take the form of the new technol-
ogy. This means that we have passed the midpoint of the diffusion process. The
parameterization of the diffusion process (T,ψt) is consistent with observations
as discussed in Section 2. The rate of capital-embodied technological change
for the old and new technology corresponds to the average rate of decline for
the relative price of equipment before and after 1974. The parameterization of
the internal learning process (λ,e1
t0,1) is based on Bahk and Gort (1993). We
know the least about learning externalities (ρ,θ). I simply assume that ρ = 0.8
and that in the years before 1974 the economy was on its balanced growth
path. With this observation I can recover the value of θ.
11 The assumption that experience is not transferable across technologies is extreme, but
allowing for partial transferability changes the results insigniﬁcantly.            
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Table 1 Parameter Values
Solow growth model α = 0.3, δ = 0.1, σ = 0.20
Disembodied technological change γz = 1.00
Capital-embodied technological
change γ1
q = 1.03 and γ2
q = 1.04
Learning λ = 0.7 and e1
t0,1 = 0.8
Learning externality ρ = 0.8 and θ = 12.11
Diffusion T = 40 and ψt follows an S-shaped diffusion
(third-order polynomial)
The results are displayed in Figure 5. Panel a shows the gradual diffusion
of the new technology for investment and the capital stock. Since investment
adds to the existing capital stock, the diffusion of the new technology in the
total capital stock proceeds at a slower rate than it does relative to investment.
Panels c and d display measured TFP growth rates and output growth rates,
and we observe a long-lasting and substantial decline in measured TFP growth
and output growth (1 percentage point). This decline bottoms out in the mid-
’80s, and we are now in a recovery phase. According to this simulation we can
expect a considerable increase of the trend growth rates for measured TFP and
output for the next 20 years. Panel f shows that the effects of the lower output
growth are quite substantial in the sense that another 15 years have to pass
before the level of output catches up with the initial balanced growth path.12
Why do we get these big effects during the transitional period when the
new technology is adopted? The simple answer lies in the graph of initial
experience for the two technologies (panel b of Figure 5). Notice that initial
experience in the old technology is declining during the transitional phase. The
decline occurs because according to the speciﬁcation of the learning externality
(8a), the contribution of a vintage is weighted by employment in that vintage.
During the transitional phase employment shifts from old to new technologies
and, with this learning speciﬁcation, the economy tends to “forget” about the
old technology. Sizeable changes in output and measured TFP growth do not
occur, however, because investment in new technologies starts out with a low
experience; these changes make up only a small fraction of total investment
after all. Rather the big changes in output and measured TFP growth occur
because initial experience is falling for investment in old technologies, and this
investment contributes the most to total capital accumulation.
12 The results are sensitive with respect to technology spillovers ρ. If spillovers are unim-
portant (ρ = 0.5), then the decline in measured TFP growth is much more persistent, and output
growth does not overshoot very much.  
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Figure 5 A Transition Path with Big Effects         
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We can evaluate the importance of this effect by changing the speciﬁca-
tion of the learning externality (8a) such that we do not weight experience by
employment; that is, how much the experience of an old vintage contributes to
the initial experience of a new vintage is independent of how intensively the









The results of this change are displayed in Figure 6. Note that with this speci-
ﬁcation initial experience with the old technology remains constant at 0.8. As
we can see, the maximal reduction in measured TFP growth is now only 0.04
percentage points, as opposed to 1 percentage point previously, and there is
almost no decline in output growth; the maximal increase corresponds to the
balanced growth increase of about 0.5 percentage points.
I am not aware of any empirical work that has studied the quantitative
properties of the transfer of knowledge in the economy and that would allow
us to pick between the two learning speciﬁcations (8a) and (8c). Although I
ﬁnd speciﬁcation (8a) reasonable—in the sense that intensity of use should
matter for the transfer of knowledge—and although it is quite possible that an
economy “forgets” about old technologies if they are not used, I do not believe
that the process occurs as fast as implied by the speciﬁcation above. If, as I
believe, the economy is not that forgetful, then speciﬁcation (8c) may be a
good short- to medium-term approximation, and I would have to conclude that
the possible effects of a technological revolution are limited.
3. RECONSIDERING THE MEASUREMENT OF
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
This article reviews the possible implications of a technological revolution
for the measurement of the U.S. economy’s productivity performance. I have
shown evidence for the acceleration of capital-embodied technological change
and at the same time a substantial decline of TFP, which represents disembod-
ied technological change. I have argued that part of the decline in TFP can in
principle be attributed to a measurement problem associated with accumulat-
ing informational capital during a technological revolution. Unfortunately, the
process by which informational capital is accumulated in an economy is not
well understood, and any exercise that studies this aspect of the economy has
to be somewhat speculative in nature. I would like to conclude my discussion
of the U.S. economy’s productivity performance with one more observation.
Although this observation makes the description of productivity behavior even
more ambiguous, it seems to indicate that the performance of the U.S. economy
has not been as bad as Figure 1 suggests.  
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My discussion of the implications of a technological revolution has focused
on problems associated with the measurement of capital in a broad sense.
Part of the measurement problem is accounting for changes in the quality of
producer-durable goods, but for this part I have taken the view that Gordon’s
(1990) price index does account for most of the quality changes that occur for
producer-durable goods. I have also identiﬁed embodied technological progress
with the rate of decline of the price of producer-durable goods relative to con-
sumption goods. At this point I should note that the quality of consumption
goods also changes over time, a process that in principle is no different from
that of producer-durable goods. But this means that for the construction of a
consumer price index one also has to be careful how one accounts for quality
change in new consumer goods. To the extent that our consumer price index
does not capture quality changes in goods, we will overestimate the rate of
price increase and underestimate the growth in real consumption.13
The diffusion of information technologies has certainly affected the quality
of consumer goods we are now able to purchase, an observation that is most
evident for consumer services. Take, for example, the services provided by the
ﬁnancial sector: we are now able to obtain cash at conveniently located auto-
matic teller machines, we can access our bank accounts and make transactions
from home, we can trade shares directly on the Internet without going through
a broker, etc. It has always been recognized that accounting for quality changes
is relatively more difﬁcult for services than it is for commodities, a problem
that has probably been exacerbated through increasingly widespread use of the
new information technologies.14
A price index that overestimates the rate of price increase for consumer
goods has two implications for the productivity growth measures I have dis-
cussed in this article. First, since the rate of decline for the price of producer-
durable goods relative to the price of consumer goods is overestimated, the rate
of embodied technological change is overestimated. Second, because output as
measured in terms of consumption goods is actually growing faster than the
consumption price index seems to indicate, the rate of disembodied techno-
logical change is underestimated. Can we say anything about the potential
magnitude of this measurement problem?
I have argued that the measurement problem is probably more relevant for
the consumption of services rather than the consumption of goods. If services
made up only a small fraction of consumption, the potential bias would probably
be small, but today expenditures on services excluding housing are about 50
percent higher than expenditures on nondurable goods. Since the price index
for nondurable consumption goods appears to be less subject to measurement
13 For a discussion of the potential biases in the consumer price index, see Boskin et al.
(1996).
14 See Griliches (1994) on the quality of output and price indexes for different industries.      
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Figure 7 Measures of Embodied and Disembodied Technological
Change Reconsidered
error than the price index for services, I recalculated the estimates for em-
bodied and disembodied technological change using the price index for non-
durable consumption goods only, rather than the price index for nondurable
goods and services (excluding housing) as shown in Figure 1. The revised
productivity series are graphed in Figure 7.
The alternative measure of real output mainly effects the measure of disem-
bodied technological change as opposed to the measure of embodied technolog-
ical change. Embodied technological change now proceeds at a slower rate, and
it does not accelerate as much in the mid-’70s.15 The effect on the measure of
disembodied technological change as reﬂected in TFP growth is more dramatic.
With the new measure of real output, TFP growth still stagnates starting in the
’70s, but there is no longer a secular decline. Notice also the strong recovery of
TFP since the early ’90s, although it remains to be seen whether this is a purely
cyclical upswing or whether it represents a change in the long-run growth path
for TFP. In conclusion, as is evident from Figures 1 and 7, the productivity
15 The rate of price decline now accelerates from 2.7 percent before 1973 to 3.5 percent
after 1977.    
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performance of the U.S. economy appears to be consistent with a wide range
of views, from pessimistic to guardedly optimistic. Clearly more work has to
be done.
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